Bibliography
Sanskrit texts
[Bhāskarī] Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, Doctrine of Divine Recognition, vol. I & II: Sanskrit text with the commentary Bhāskarī, K.A.S. Iyer & K.C. Pandey eds. [Allahabad: [1938], Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986.
Brahmasūtra, Śaṅkarabhāṣya, with the commentaries Bhāmatī, Kalpataru and Parimala, K.L. Joshi ed. 2 vols., Delhi: Parimal Publications (third ed.), 1996.
[ĪPK = Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā] See Torella 2002.
[ĪPV] Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, M.R. Shāstrī/M.K. Shāstrī eds. 2 vols., Srinagar: Nirnaya Sagar Press, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 22 & 33, 1918-1921.
[ĪPVV] Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī by Abhinavagupta, M.K. Shāstrī ed. 3 vols., Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 60, 62 and 65, 1938-1943.
[Nyāyabhāṣya] Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, A. Thakur ed. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Nyāyacaturgranthikā 1, 1997.
[Nyāyasūtra] See Nyāyabhāṣya.
[Pramāṇavārttika 1] The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary, R. Gnoli ed. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, Serie Orientale Roma 23, 1960.
[Pramāṇavārttika 2, in] “Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)”, Y. Miyasaka ed. Acta Indologica 2, p. 1-206, 1971-1972.
[Svavṛtti] See Pramāṇavārttika 1.
[Vṛtti = Īśvarapratyabhijñāvṛtti] See Torella [2002].
Studies and translations
Ashok Aklujkar, “Bhartṛhari’s Concept of the Veda”, in J. Bronkhorst & M. M. Deshpande (eds.), Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference, Vols. IV and V, Leiden, Brill, 1991, p. 1-18.
Ashok Aklujkar, “Veda revelation according to Bhartṛhari”, in M. Chaturvedi (ed.), Bhartṛhari. Language, Thought and Reality (Proceedings of the International Seminar, Delhi, December 12-14, 2003), New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 2009, p. 1-97.
Johannes Bronkhorst, “The Peacock’s Egg: Bhartṛhari on Language and Reality”, Philosophy East and West 51, 4 (2001), p. 474-491.
George Chemparathy, L’Autorité du Veda selon les Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Louvain-la-Neuve, Centre d’Histoire des Religions, 1983.
Collett Cox, “The Unbroken Treatise: Scripture and Argument in Early Buddhist Scholasticism”, in M.A. Williams, C. Cox & M. Jaffe (eds.), Innovation in Religious Traditions. Essays in the interpretation of religious change, Berlin, Mouton de Gruyter, 1992, p. 143-189.
Collett Cox, Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories of Existence. An Annotated Translation of the Section on Factors Dissociated from Thought from Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra, Tokyo, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995.
René Descartes, Œuvres philosophiques (1618-50), F. Alquié (ed.), 2 vols., Paris, Garnier Frères, 1963.
K.L. Dhammajoti, “Logic in the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā”, Journal of Buddhist Studies (Columbo) 2 (2004), p. 1-11.
Francis X. D’Sa, Śabdaprāmāṇyam in Śabara and Kumārila. Towards a Study of the Mīmāṃsā Experience of Language, Vienna, De Nobili Research Library, 1980.
Paul Dundas, History, Scripture and Controversy in a Medieval Jain Sect, London/New-York, Routledge, 2007.
Vincent Eltschinger, Penser l’autorité des Écritures. La polémique de Dharmakīrti contre la notion brahmanique orthodoxe d’un Veda sans auteur, Vienna, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007.
Vincent Eltschinger, Buddhist Epistemology as Apologetics. Studies on the History, Self-understanding and Dogmatic Foundations of Late Indian Buddhist Philosophy, Vienna, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2014.
Vincent Eltschinger & Helmut Krasser, Scriptural Authority, Reason and Action. Proceedings of a Panel at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference (Kyoto, September 1st-5th 2009), Vienna, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2013.
Vincent Eltschinger, Helmut Krasser & John Taber, Can the Veda Speak? Dharmakīrti against Mīmāṃsā exegetics and Vedic authority, Vienna, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2012.
Vincent Eltschinger & Isabelle Ratié, Self, No-Self, and Salvation. Dharmakīrti’s Critique of the Notions of Self and Person, Vienna, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2013.
Paul Hacker, “Religiöse Toleranz und Intoleranz im Hinduismus”, Saeculum 8 (1957), 167-179. Repr. in L. Schmithausen (ed.), Paul Hacker. Kleine Schriften, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, p. 376-388.
Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe. An Essay in Understanding, Albany, SUNY Press, 1998.
Jürgen Hanneder, Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy of Revelation. Mālinīślokavārttika I, 1-399, Groningen, Egbert Forsten, 1998.
Jan E.M. Houben, “Bhartṛhari’s Perspectivism (1): The Vṛtti and Bhartṛhari’s Perspectivism in the First kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya”, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 59 (1997), p. 317-358.
Jean Jolivet, “Scolastique”, in Encyclopædia Universalis, vol. XIV, Paris, Encyclopædia Universalis France, 1972, p. 774-775.
Birgit Kellner, “First logic, then the Buddha? The controversy about the chapter sequence of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika and the soteriological relevance of inference”, Hōrin 11 (2004), p. 147-167.
Helmut Krasser, “On Dharmakīrti’s Understanding of pramāṇabhūta and His Definition of pramāṇa”, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 45 (2001), p. 173-199.
Helmut Krasser, “Are Buddhist Pramāṇavādins non-Buddhistic? Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on the Impact of Logic and Epistemology on Emancipation”, Hōrin 11 (2004), p. 129-146.
Helmut Krasser, “Logic in a Religious Context: Dharmakīrti in Defence of āgama”, in Eltschinger, Krasser & Taber 2012, p. 83-118.
Shinya Moriyama, “On the Role of abhyupagama in Dharmakīrti’s Scripturally Based Inference”, in Eltschinger & Krasser 2013 (eds.), p. 183-207.
Karin Preisendanz, “Debate and Independent Reasoning vs. Tradition: on the Precarious Position of Early Nyāya”, in R. Tsuchida & A. Wezler (eds.), Harānandalaharī. Volume in Honour of Professor Minoru Hara on his Seventieth Birthday, Reinbek, 2000, p. 221-251.
Isabelle Ratié, Le Soi et l’Autre. Identité, différence et altérité dans la philosophie de la Pratyabhijñā, Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2011.
Isabelle Ratié, “On Reason and Scripture in the Pratyabhijñā”, in Eltschinger & Krasser 2013 (eds.), p. 375-454.
Isabelle Ratié, “Utpaladeva’s Proof of God: on the Purpose of the Īśvarasiddhi”, in B. Bäumer & R. Torella (eds.), Utpaladeva, Philosopher of Recognition, Delhi, DK Printworld, 2015, p. 254-337.
David Seyfort Ruegg, “Pramāṇabhūta, *pramāṇa(bhūta)-puruṣa, pratyakṣadharman and sākṣātkṛtadharman as Epithets of the ṛṣi, ācārya and tathāgata in Grammatical, Epistemological and Madhyamaka Texts”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 57 (1994), p. 303-320.
Theodore I. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic (1930-1932), 2 vols., New Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal, 1986.
Ernst Steinkellner, “The Spiritual Place of the Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism”, Nanto Bukkyo 49 (1982), p. 1-15.
Tom Tillemans, “Dharmakīrti, Āryadeva and Dharmapāla on Scriptural Authority”, Tetsugaku 38 (1986), p. 31-47.
Tom Tillemans, “How Much of a Proof is Scripturally Based Inference (āgamāśritānumāna)?”, in S. Katsura (ed.), Dharmakīrti’s Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy, Vienna, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999, p. 395-404.
Tom Tillemans, Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika. An annotated translation of the fourth chapter (parārthānumāna). Volume 1 (k. 1-148), Vienna, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000.
Raffaele Torella, Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author’s Vṛtti, critical edition and annotated translation (1994), Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 2002.
Raffaele Torella, “From an Adversary to the Main Ally: the Place of Bhartṛhari in the Kashmirian Shaiva Advaita”, in M. Kaul & A. Aklujkar (eds.), The Grammatical Traditions of Kashmir: Essays in Memory of Pandit Dinanath Yaksh, Delhi, DK Printworld, 2008, p. 508-524.
Raffaele Torella, “Inherited cognitions: prasiddhi, āgama, pratibhā, śabdana – Bhartṛhari, Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti in dialogue”, in Eltschinger & Krasser 2013 (eds.), p. 455-480.
Vittorio A. van Bijlert, Epistemology and Spiritual Authority. The Development of Epistemology and Logic in the Old Nyāya and the Buddhist School of Epistemology, with an Annotated Translation of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika II (Pramāṇasiddhi) vv. 1-7, Vienna, Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1989.
Tilmann Vetter, Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika. Der Abschnitt über die vier edlen Wahrheiten im Pramāṇasiddhi-Kapitel, Vienna, Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1990.
Albrecht Wezler, “Zur Proklamation religiös-weltanschaulicher Toleranz bei dem indischen Philosophen Jayantabhaṭṭa”, Saeculum 27 (1976), p. 329-347.
Hideomi Yaita, “Dharmakīrti on the Authority of Buddhist Scriptures (āgama) – an Annotated Translation of the Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti”, Nanto Bukkyo 58 (1987), p. 1-17.
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Notes
See e.g. Jolivet [1972, p. 775] on this “aspect capital de la scolastique”.
The Sanskrit term does not necessarily designate a written text, and rather brings to mind the mere notion of a discourse that has « come down » to us (āgata) through tradition, hence translations such as “traditional knowledge” [Houben 1997, p. 322] or “tradition” [Bronkhorst 2001, p. 484]. Nonetheless, given that the texts mentioned below use the word in the narrower sense of a speech that is authoritative on principle insofar as it belongs to a form of revelation, it seems to me that translations such as “scripture” and “revealed speech”, however unsatisfactory, are to be preferred in this context.
To give but one example of a major divergence, according to some of these movements, scriptural authority comes from the fact that a discourse was uttered in the first place by an authoritative person (āpta) whose word cannot be doubted due to his/her divine status or eminent wisdom (the notion is found in Buddhism but also in various Brahmanical and pseudo-Brahmanical currents such as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika or Sāṅkhya). In contrast, however, the Mīmāṃsakas’ orthodox Brahmanical movement or the tradition of the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari consider that the authority of the Veda rather comes from its authorlessness, the Vedic speech being conceived of as eternal and uncreated.
Thus according to Nyāyabhāṣya: 3 (on Nyāyasūtra), inference “rests on perception and scripture” (pratyakṣāgamāśrita) and an inference “contradicted by perception or scripture” is only a pseudo-reasoning (nyāyābhāsa): rational inquiry must agree with scriptural statements in order to be valid.
On this tension in the Nyāya, see Preisendanz [2000].
There are, however, a number of studies devoted to the definition of scriptural authority in this or that Indian current of thought. Apart from the works on scriptural authority in Buddhism and Śaivism that are mentioned below (fn. 7 and36), mention should be made in particular of D’Sa [1980], Chemparathy [1983], van Bijlert [1989], Aklujkar [1991] and [2009], Dundas [2007], and Eltschinger & Krasser (eds.) [2013].
See in particular Tillemans [1986], Yaita [1987], Seyfort Ruegg [1994], Tillemans [1999], Kellner [2004], Eltschinger [2007], Krasser [2012] and Eltschinger [2014].
See e.g. Cox [1992, p. 146-147]: “Those who understand Buddhism as an essentialistic unfolding of a universalistic ethic or philosophical realization also would assume or even attempt to reconstruct an “original Buddhism” prior to its constitution as a scriptural tradition [...]. The elaboration of Buddhism in ever more complex scriptures would then be seen to be [...], at worst, a deformation of the essence of the religion by scholastic professionals [...]. A corrective to this essentialistic view [...] is provided by a view that focuses on Buddhism as a scriptural tradition in a continual historical process of transforming self-interpretation.”
See ibid., p. 147: “The early scholastic period, concomitant with the increasing closure of the canon and the emergence of self-conscious techniques of exegesis and argumentation, is often singled out in the essentialistic view as the period of greatest deformation. And yet, this early scholastic period can better be understood not as a rupture, but as a progression consistent with the intrinsic pattern of Indian scriptural development. This scholastic period in Buddhism begins in the first centuries B.C.E. with the appearance of the Abhidharma, or independent exegetical treatises on the teaching of the Buddha. It continues with the proliferation of differing doctrinal viewpoints and the emergence of sectarian self-consciousness, and concludes with the culmination of this scholastic Abhidharma endeavor in the 5th century C.E.”
See above, fn. 3.
On the role allotted to yukti and āgama and on the notion of āptāgama in abhidharmic literature, see Cox [1992, p. 160 et 170-173; 1995, p. 14-15], Dhammajoti [2004] and Eltschinger [2014, p. 196-201].
However, the Madhyamaka tradition still admits āgama among pramāṇas (see Eltschinger [2014, p. 199, fn. 25]).
Pramāṇavārttika 1.215: pratyakṣeṇānumānena dvividhenāpy abādhanam | dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthayor asyāvisaṃvādas tadarthayoḥ || “The reliability of this [treatise claiming scriptural authority] with respect to perceptible as well as imperceptible objects consists in the fact that neither direct perception nor the two kinds of inference invalidate these objects [as they are described in the treatise].” On this verse and Dharmakīrti’s own explanation of it in Svavṛtti: 108, see Yaita [1987, p. 7-8, Eltschinger [2007, p. 221-223], Moriyama [2013] and Eltschinger [2014, p. 211-213]. The translations of Svavṛtti: 108-109 given here are borrowed from, or at least greatly indebted to, Eltschinger [2007; 2014].
Svavṛtti: 108: pratyakṣeṇābādhanaṃ pratyakṣābhimatānām arthānāṃ tathābhāvaḥ... atathābhimatānāṃ cāpratyakṣatā. “[The treatise under examination] is not invalidated by perception if the objects that [it] considers as perceptible [turn out to] be so [...] and if the [objects] that [it] does not consider as being so [turn out to] be imperceptible.”
Svavṛtti: 108: tathānāgamāpekṣānumānaviṣayābhimatānāṃ tathābhāvaḥ. yathā caturṇām āryasatyānām. ananumeyānāṃ tathābhāvaḥ. yathātmādīnām. “In the same way, [the treatise under examination is not invalidated by inference] if the [objects] that [it] considers as pertaining to the realm of the [kind of] inference that does not depend on an āgama [turn out] to be so – for example the four Noble Truths – and if [the objects that it presents as] impossible to infer [turn out] to be so – for example the Self (ātman) and other [entities that cannot be proved to exist through inference].” On the type of inference that depends on āgama see next fn.
Svavṛtti: 108: āgamāpekṣānumāne’pi yathā rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ cādharmam abhyupagamya tatprahāṇāya snānāgnihotrāder anupadeśaḥ. “The same [goes] for an inference that depends on āgama (āgamāpekṣānumāna) [and consists in spotting internal contradictions in a treatise]; for instance, if [a treatise] admits that demerit (adharma) consists in e.g. concupiscence and [the acts] resulting from it, [it can]not teach that ablutions, an oblation to fire, etc. can succeed in eliminating this [demerit, since neither ablutions nor oblations to fire can eliminate concupiscence and the acts resulting from it].” The āgamāpekṣānumāna rests on āgama insofar as it deals with objects that are not accessible through perception or ordinary inference. Nonetheless, contrary to what the literal meaning of the compound might lead to believe, it seems that its purpose is not to demonstrate the existence of these objects by relying on scriptural authority: it rather relies on various scriptural statements to detect contradictions in them (its function therefore appears to consist in establishing the invalidity of a scripture). On this inference (which has been interpreted in very different ways), see Tillemans [1999], Eltschinger [2007, p. 105-109], Krasser [2012, p. 111-113] and Moriyama [2013].
That is to say, what escapes the sensory range of ordinary individuals by nature and is not due to some particular circumstance, since inference has the power to establish the existence of realities that are only contingently beyond senses (parokṣa). See e.g. Tillemans [2000, p. 78-79].
Svavṛtti: 108; see Tillemans [2000, p. 78-82], Eltschinger [2007, p. 71] and Krasser [2012, p. 85].
Svavṛtti: 108 : nāyaṃ puruṣo’nāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsituṃ samarthaḥ... “The individual [who wishes to act] cannot live without having recourse to the authority of a scripture.”
Svavṛtti: 108: anāntarīyakatvād artheṣu śabdānām.
See Pramāṇavārttika 1.213: nāntarīyakatābhāvāc chabdānāṃ vastubhiḥ saha | nārthasiddhis tatas te hi vaktrabhiprāyasūcakāḥ || “Since words do not have any necessary connection with [real] things, no [external] object can be established through them, for [words only] indicate the speaker’s intention.”
The case of his predecessor Dignāga is more complex, and it is particularly difficult to determine the exact meaning in Dignāga’s work of the statement according to which āgama is a kind of inference (Pramāṇasamuccaya 2.5ab): see Eltschinger [2007, p. 69-70].
This is why according to Dharmakīrti, Dignāga’s assertion that the Buddha is pramāṇabhūta (a compound that one might at first sight read as meaning “that consists in/has become a means of valid knowledge”) should be understood as a mere metaphor. On the meaning of pramāṇabhūta according to Dharmakīrti and his commentators see e.g. Seyfort Ruegg [1994], Krasser [2001] and [2012, p. 105].
Svavṛtti:167-168: nanu kaścil lokasanniveśādir ayuktiviṣayo’pi sambhāvanīyapuruṣavacanād arthaḥ pratipadyate. na, apratyayāt. na hi kvacid askhalita iti sarvaṃ tathā, vyabhicāradarśanāt, tatpravṛtter avisaṃvādena vyāptyasiddheś ca. agatyā cedam āgamalakṣaṇam iṣṭam. nāto niścayaḥ. tan na pramāṇam āgama ity apy uktam. On this famous passage see e.g. Tillemans [1999, p. 400], Eltschinger [2007, p. 75] and Krasser [2012, p. 104].
This example is given by Dharmakīrti to illustrate the incorrectness of the śeṣavat type of inference defended in particular in the Nyāya (see Svavṛtti on Pramāṇavārttika 1.331: 173 and Eltschinger, Krasser & Taber [2012, p. 63]).
This is an allusion to the virulent critique of the notion of āpta by the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila (on this critique see e.g. Eltschinger [2014, p. 208-210]).
Krasser [2012, p. 84 and 118].
See for instance the oft-quoted formulation of this idea in Stcherbatsky [1930-32, vol. II, p. 2], with respect to Buddhist logic: “in the intention of its promoters the system had apparently no special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e., as the teaching of a path towards Salvation.”
See Steinkellner [1982], Krasser [2004] and Eltschinger [2014].
See Eltschinger, Krasser & Taber [2012].
One could also mention the defense of the Buddhist nairātmya (on the latter see Eltschinger & Ratié [2013]).
On the rational defense of the four Noble Truths in Pramāṇavārttika 2.145-279, see Vetter [1990, p. 52-168]. Cf. above, fn. 15, for Dharmakīrti’s statement that the four Noble Truths belong to the realm of inference.
See Eltschinger [2014].
Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā (hereafter ĪPK).
That is to say, two commentaries on the ĪPK by Utpaladeva himself (the Vṛtti, a brief explanation, and the longer Vivṛti, of which only fragments are known to date) and two commentaries by Abhinavagupta (the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, hereafter ĪPV, and the monumental Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī, hereafter ĪPVV).
On the nondualist Śaivas’ understanding of āgama see Hanneder [1998], Ratié [2013] and Torella [2013].
pratyakṣāder api jīvitakalpaḥ (ĪPV, vol. II: 80; cf. ĪPVV, vol. III: 84: pratyakṣāder api jīvitakalpaṃ).
See e.g. ĪPVV, vol. III: 95-96: sarvathā tarko’pratiṣṭha eva. tathaiva hi parameśvareṇa sa sṛṣṭaḥ [...] apratiṣṭhatve’pi tu tarkasya nāsmaddarśanasya khaṇḍanā kācit. ābhāsamānavastuvāde hi parameśvarecchayāyam ābhāsaniyamaḥ. “Reasoning (tarka) is entirely devoid of foundation (apratiṣṭha); for it is created by the Highest Lord exactly as [the rest of the universe] [...]. But although [we consider that] reasoning is devoid of foundation, this implies no contradiction for our system; for in [our] doctrine according to which reality is [what] is manifest, the necessity (niyama) [that links the various] phenomena is due to the [free] will of the Highest Lord.” For an analysis and translation of the entire passage see Ratié [2013, p. 393-400].
Readers who might find this idea strikingly opposed to a “Cartesian” approach could be reminded that Descartes actually defended a rather similar thesis, that of the “création des vérités mathématiques”, according to which God establishes the mathematical truths that seem necessary to us as a result of his free will, “as a king establishes laws in his kingdom” (“ainsi qu’un roi établit des lois en son royaume” [Lettre au père Mersenne, 15/04/1630, in Descartes 1618-50, vol. I, p. 259-260]), so that from God’s point of view, even mathematical necessity remains contingent.
ĪPVV, vol. III: 96: tad ayam alabdhagādha eva tarkaḥ śobhate, atra tu svabuddhigarveṇa pratiṣṭhāṃ paśyan svagṛhaprāṅgaṇamadhyakalpitaniḥśeṣabhūgolakamadhyadhruvakasthānavan mūḍho vā ḍimbaviḍambako vety āstām. sarvathānumāne nāśvasitavyam api tv āgama eva.
ĪPV, vol. II: 84: tena pratyakṣāgamau bādhakāv anumānasyeti tatrabhavadbhartṛharinyāyabhāṣyakṛtprabhṛtayaḥ. “This is why the master Bhartṛhari, the author of the Nyāyabhāṣya and [others assert] that perception and āgama [have the power to] invalidate inference.” On the influence on the Śaivas of passages in Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya stating the superiority of āgama on inference, see Ratié [2013, p. 402-405]. For other Śaiva borrowings from Bhartṛhari regarding the definition of āgama, see Torella, [2013], and on Utpaladeva’s overall debt towards the grammarian-philosopher, see Torella [2008].
Brahmasūtra 2.1.11.
ĪPK 4.16; cf. Vṛtti ad loc.: 80 (abhinavo mārgaḥ).
One should note, however, that Utpaladeva had at least two important precursors in this respect. One of them, Sadyojyotis (c. 675-725?), was the first Śaiva author to compose independent treatises that have come down to us (rather than āgamas or commentaries thereon), and his influence on Utpaladeva was profound (see Ratié [2015]) even though Utpaladeva avoids highlighting this debt (probably because Sadyojyotis belonged to the rival dualist current of the Śaivasiddhānta). The other, Somānanda, has authored the Śivadṛṣṭi, of which the Pratyabhijñā treatise is supposedly a mere “reflection” (pratibimbaka, ĪPV, vol. I: 7); however, as emphasized by R. Torella, Utpaladeva’s work differs quite strikingly, in its method as well as in the choice of its opponents, from Somānanda’s (see Torella [2002, p. xxii-xxxvi] and Torella [2008]).
See for instance ĪPV, vol. I: 18: sphuṭatarabhāsamānanīlasukhādipramānveṣaṇādvāreṇaiva pāramārthikapramātṛlābha ihopadiśyate. “What is taught in this [treatise] is [how] to attain the ultimately real subject merely through an examination (anveṣaṇā) of the knowledges [resulting from cognitive acts], such as ‘blue’, ‘pleasure’, etc., which are manifest in the most obvious way [in each of us].”
Cf. Bhāskarī, vol. I: 82: iha – asmiñ śāstramārge.
ĪPV, vol. I: 51: iha yat paramārtharūpaṃ tad āśaṅkyamānapratipakṣapratikṣepeṇa nirūpayiṣyamāṇaṃ suṣṭhutamāṃ spaṣṭīkṛtaṃ bhavati.
See Torella, [2002, xxx] and Torella [2008, p. 517].
That is to say, the existence of a permanent conscious substance (ātman) within each individual, but also the fact that this ātman is possessed of infinite powers of knowledge and action.
ĪPK 1.1.2 (on this verse and its commentaries see Torella [2002, p. 85-86] and Ratié [2011, p. 23-28]).
ĪPK 1.1.3 (see Torella [2002, p. 86-87] and Ratié [2011, p. 28-31]).
ĪPV, vol. II: 127 (see Ratié [2013, p. 426, fn. 111]).
ĪPVV, vol. III: 181: so’nenecchādiśaktiprabhāvaprakhyāpakena pūrṇaparārthānumānarūpeṇa vyavahārasādhanena pratyabhijñākhyena śāstreṇāvabodhyate. On the soteriological power of inferential discourse and on the svabhāvahetu type of inference in which the treatise consists according to Utpaladeva, see Ratié [2011, p. 726-739] and Ratié [2013, p. 425-438].
Admittedly, this power remains conditioned by the will of Śiva, since liberation is seen by the nondualist Śaivas as a divine grace (anugraha). Nonetheless, the grace in question is not that of a God distinct from the individual, but the free will of the individual himself who chooses to ignore his divine identity or to acknowledge it (see Ratié [2011, p. 565-570 and p. 738-739]).
On Bhartṛhari’s use of the word “Veda” to designate either a single, subtle form, or the discourses expressing this form, see Aklujkar [1991, p. 5 and 14, fn. 33], and Aklujkar [2009, p. 54-55].
ĪPV, vol. II: 80.
On vimarśa and its complex relationship with language in the Pratyabhijñā, see e.g. Torella [2002, xxiv-xxv] and Ratié [2011, p. 158-167 and 495-525].
ĪPVV, vol. III: 84.
ĪPV, vol. II: 80.
ĪPV, vol. II: 81-82 : tena hi yac chabdanam utpāditaṃ jyotiṣṭomakāry ahaṃ svargaṃ ganteti dīkṣito’ham apunarāvṛttibhāgīti, kāruṇiko’haṃ buddhapadaṃ ganteti, gāḍhakleśasahiṣṇur aham arhatpadaṃ prapatteti, tatra na viparyaya udeti, tadāśvastasyaiva tatrānuṣṭhānayogyatvāt, anyasya tu dṛḍhapratipattirūpatvābhāvād apramāṇam eva tathāvimarśānātmakaṃ* śabdanam. [*tathāvimarśānātmakaṃ conj.: tathāvimarśanātmakaṃ ĪPV.]
ĪPVV, vol. III: 97: yatra tv anyāgamasaṃvalanayā pramātuḥ pūrvam evāham ayuktakāry abhavam iti pratyayo jāyate, tatra nāgamatvam eva.
On this “inclusivistic” device in Indian philosophico-religious literature, and on the fact that the “tolerance” professed in such cases usually goes together with an effort to annex and subordinate rival religious movements, see Hacker [1957], Wezler [1976] and Halbfass [1988, p. 403-418]. On such maneuvers in Śaiva literature and the scriptural hierarchy envisioned by the nondualist Śaivas, see Hanneder [1998, chapter 1] and Ratié [2013, p. 415-419].
See ĪPV, vol. II: 271: abhinavaḥ – sarvarahasyaśāstrāntargataḥ saṃnigūḍhatvād aprasiddhaḥ. “This new [path, i.e. this path] that was [already] contained in all the [Śaiva] esoteric treatises (rahasyaśāstra) but was not well known (aprasiddha), because [so far] it was hidden [in them]...” As already noted in Ratié, [2013, 436, fn. 132], Utpaladeva himself seems to have developed this idea in his lost Vivṛti, as shown by the fragmentary quote in ĪPVV, vol. III: 401: aspaṣṭatvād iti..., “because it was not obvious...”, and Abhinavagupta’s commentary, in particular the following: yad api rahasyāgameṣu nirūpitaṃ tathā vispaṣṭatvena noktaṃ garbhīkṛtya tu nirūpitam... “This too, which had been explained in the esoteric scriptures (rahasyāgama) – [i.e.] which had not been expounded thus in an explicit way, but the explanation of which was contained in embryonic form [in these esoteric scriptures]...”
See e.g. ĪPV, vol. I: 43-44, which sums up the treatise’s main inference in the following way: tad ayaṃ pramātā jñānakriyāśaktiyogād īśvara iti vyavahartavyaḥ purāṇāgamādiprasiddheśvaravat. “So one must use [the word] ‘Lord’ with respect to the knowing subject, because [this knowing subject] possesses the powers of knowledge and action, just as the Lord who is well known through the Purāṇas, āgamas and so on.”
On prasiddhi (a word that can simply mean “common knowledge” but may also designate an insight present in perception and inference and constituting the core of āgama as a pramāṇa) see Torella [2013].
ĪPVV, vol. I: 32: purāṇādisiddhe’pīśvare’naṅgīkriyamāṇe gṛhagrāmamaṇḍaleśvaraprasiddhau tadviṣayāpratihatajñānakaraṇa evaiśvaryasya lakṣaṇam, te ca pramātṛtattve sarvaviṣaye’pratihata eveti.
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